This paper aims to contribute to the dialogue between psychoanalysis and neuroscience, taking as a starting point the assumption that these disciplines deal with virtual structures and their functions, founded on material structures. It is necessary to accept the existence of continuity between these structures since they represent two facets of the same noumenal reality, though with different phenomenal expressions, and that it is possible to use metapsychology as a lingua franca to set up communication between them.
This paper aims to contribute to the dialogue between psychoanalysis and neuroscience, taking as a starting point the assumption that these disciplines deal with virtual structures and their functions, founded on material structures. It is necessary to accept the existence of continuity between these structures since they represent two facets of the same noumenal reality, though with different phenomenal expressions, and that it is possible to use metapsychology as a lingua franca to set up communication between them.
The second part of the paper attempts to show how psychoanalysis deals with the metamorphosis of these structures and how it is possible to pass from neurophysiological to psychological phenomenology, without denying the existence of a 'mysterious leap' (Freud, 1916-7) between mind and body and vice versa. The passage from mirror neuron functioning to imitative processes, that is from a somatic to a psychic phenomenon, and from the transformation of a neurological to a psychological activity, is an example of this transformation process within a somatopsychic continuum.
Problems of method
The first points to make when broaching the subject of the dialogue between psychoanalysis and neuroscience are those regarding 'method': in other words, we must ask which methods we will use to make such a dialogue possible without expecting to use one of the two disciplines to validate the other. What interests us is the shifting of the relationship between psychoanalysis and neuroscience from a position of sterile conflict to a new viewpoint from which both can be observed. There is no easy solution. The methods of transit that make dialogue possible between psychoanalysis and neuroscience cannot be reduced to one: various options must be borne in mind.
As usual, I begin by listening to Freud: 'In itself every science is one-sided. It must be so, since it restricts itself to particular subjects, points of view and methods. It is a piece of nonsense in which I would take no part to play off one science against another. After all, physics does not diminish the value of chemistry; it cannot take its place but on the other hand cannot be replaced by it. Psycho-analysis is certainly quite particularly one-sided, as being the science of the mental unconscious' (Freud, 1926, p. 231) .
Furthermore, Freud, in a letter to Jung (30 November 1911) , maintained, apropos of Sabina Spielrein's intention to subordinate psychological material to biological points of view, that 'La ΨA farà da se [psychoanalysis goes by itself]' (McGuire, 1974, p. 286) . He therefore tended increasingly to avoid subordinating psychoanalysis to the other sciences and to base it to a greater extent on 'itself'.
Psychoanalytic method
Freud attributed three meanings to the term 'psychoanalytic method', placing them on different levels. They constitute a system of models and theories with different degrees of abstraction although closely interconnected and interacting:
1. a scientific method of observation and investigation of mental processes, especially the unconscious ones, which would not otherwise be accessible: clinical semiotics; 2. a therapeutic method: the talking cure; 3. a series of concepts and theories about psychology and psychopathology: metapyschology.
The aspects of psychoanalytic method of interest here are points 1 and 3, since Freud himself (1926) did not consider the therapeutic aspect to be the cornerstone of psychoanalysis, but held it to be just one of its applications and not even the most important.
The first observation to make is that these three definitions suffice to show that psychoanalysis can organize itself according to a self-referential circularity. Considering the three-fold structure, a complex and powerful heuristic system is evident, a begetter of new knowledge capable of founding what Assoun (1981) calls Freudian epistemology: the possibility for effecting research on the conditions of psychoanalytic knowledge itself.
Freud identified the foundations of his theory in concepts that came from within psychoanalysis, in primis the 'theory of repression', consequently postulating the existence of the 'unconscious'. Thus psychoanalysis would seem to emerge as knowledge without external foundations; a special self-founded science functioning in a self-referencing recursive way which makes use of the observation of patients within a setting. Its foundations stand mainly on the psychoanalytic method and on a powerful heuristic instrument: its inventor's self-analysis. We note that the observer's mind revealed itself to be a necessary element to the theory's structure: psychoanalysis was in the mind of Freud and that was in psychoanalysis. Here we have maximum 'involvement' of the observer in the phenomenon observed.
So, psychoanalysis is a cognitively autopoietic science. The most important consequence of this is that validation of its 'scientificity', its theoretical and clinical developments and its therapeutic efficacy, can only be effected from the theoretical premises belonging to and within psychoanalysis itself. La chose freudienne is made up of the 'object of psychoanalysis', that is of the unconscious, its theory, its method and its practice, which form a single theoretical corpus, and finally of the relative technique for investigating a field that it continually 'creates' while exploring it. The two main aspects, theory and practice, are two sides of the same coin and we cannot conceive of one without the other. Their inherent inextricableness is separated only in the descriptive domain that we sometimes use. The theory-practice, therefore, not only founds, but 'creates', the object to be investigated, which, in its turn, will permit the theory to carry out the investigation and thus authorize its possibility of validation.
This does not mean that one cannot assess psychoanalysis while being outside it, in an extraanalytic position. It only means that we must bear in mind that in that case the type of opinion formed is of a different nature: it is formulated in a different metalanguage than that of psychoanalysis. In this case, psychoanalysis is treated as a language-object by the other epistemologies which assume the task of validating it or not on the basis of their principles. So a metalanguage constructed and articulated by an observer outside the psychoanalytic system is used; this observer will come to conclusions which, though more or less valid, will have no validity for psychoanalytic epistemology. To form a psychoanalytic opinion on the validity of psychoanalysis in its most significant aspects, both theoretical-clinical and therapeutic, one must use a psychoanalytic 'language' that remains within the psychoanalytic system; otherwise one would carry out an epistemological operation that does not strictly regard psychoanalysis as such, but the philosophy of science. I believe it is vitally important to differentiate methodologically between these two types of approach in order to achieve a correct assessment of psychoanalysis, to allow dialogue with other sciences and to prevent falling into constant useless methodological confusion, although certain complementary aspects obviously exist. In short, we can say that there is no sense in using neuroscience to validate psychoanalysis and vice versa.
I am convinced that the birth, construction and history of psychoanalysis can only lead to the conclusion that it is a special self-founded, self-referential and autopoietic science, organized around a strong 'operational closure'. This closure is the strong point of its cognitive arrangement and heuristic potential; it serves to maintain its identity as a 'discipline' with the aim of avoiding, for example, eclecticism, or, worse, the mere therapeutic pragmatism of other psychotherapies, as some would unfortunately like.
It is necessary to clarify here that we are siding with 'scientific' not 'ideological dogmatism', and certainly not with 'religious dogmatism'.
The operational closure mentioned above must not, though, be mistaken for isolation from the surrounding cultural world. It is important to define the identity of psychoanalysis first so that it is possible to dialogue subsequently with the other sciences, in order to avoid making confusing mixtures or trying pseudointegrated models. Once the identity of psychoanalysis and its method has been defined, it will be possible to compare the other sciences without fear of contamination or hybridization, which would distort its peculiar characteristics.
The organization of a system defines those components that must remain invariant in order to be able to conserve the identity of the system. A system, although operatively 'closed', must, however, trade with the outside, both to maintain its internal arrangement and homeostasis and to transform itself, on pain of disorganization and death. A system's ability to adapt lies in its capacity to conserve its autonomy: it changes by selecting from outside stimuli those it believes important for change, maintaining its own identity and internal organization all the while. This holds good for psychoanalysis too.
Furthermore, we notice that the evolutionary change of an autonomous system is made possible only by the presence and stability of the part that conserves its organizational closure. In this sense, attempts to introduce continual theoretical and technical changes to psychoanalysis, as well as attempts over the years to graft new concepts on to it must be evaluated. The original theory may have difficulty integrating and co-ordinating these new concepts with Freud's theoretical nucleus, with the risk that the latter becomes fundamentally different from the 'psychoanalysis' its inventor conceived and that we know. Thus the problem is posed of choosing at what level the new theoretical and technical innovations can be inserted into the theoretical hierarchy of psychoanalysis without violating its foundations and the psychoanalytic method. I believe that as far as the dialogue with neuroscience is concerned, there is less risk, especially if one keeps to the method indicated by Freud in his works. In my opinion, the task of psychoanalytic 'orthodoxy' is at most that of operating a discrete control on methodological correctness within which the dialogue with other sciences occurs and not that of effecting conceptual closures and ideological armouring by taking up an antiscientific position.
I now examine a possible method for effecting the dialogue by which psychoanalysis can be united with neuroscience in a way that is compatible with Freud's basic assumptions.
In many neurological syndromes, there is a concomitant psychic disturbance which suggests that a relationship exists between the neuropathology and the psychopathology, though obviously the psychic symptoms cannot be reduced to organic lesions because the psychic functions do not reside in the neuroanatomical structures but, as Freud says, between them (Freud, 1900) . I would, though, like to emphasize that there is not much reductionism and it is not seen as such when scientific research increasingly accurately analyses the route from the upper to the lower levels of organization, passing through all the intermediary stages, even if it must be acknowledged that the issue of the 'mysterious leap' between body and mind has still not been resolved, nor has that of the conceptual 'gap' in a hypothetical doctrine that would like to localize psychic processes in discrete areas of the brain (Freud, 1916-7) . Freud wrote: 'However much philosophy may ignore the gulf between the physical and the mental, it still exists for our immediate experience and still more for our practical endeavours' (Freud, 1926, p. 247 ). The problems and difficulties do not lie in sustaining or refuting the postulate that psychic levels can be explained according to neurophysiology, but in demonstrating what the neurophysiological correlates of psychic character are, and how they function, and then to verify their interconnections, regardless of 'ideologies'. Solms (1995b Solms ( , 1997 , for example, proposes using Luria's 'neurodynamic approach' (1973): a method of anatomical-clinical correlation of dynamic localization that he chooses also because it is compatible with Freudian metapsychology. This method serves to identify the different components of a complex functional system. It is articulated in two successive moments: qualification (or identification) of the symptom and syndromic analysis. In the first part of the procedure the different ways in which the function under examination is damaged are assessed, and then the psychological structure of each symptom is examined by means of psychological methods of analysis for each clinical case. The second step, the syndromic analysis, lies in analysing, always with psychological methods, what other functions are disturbed, including the primary ones, with the aim of discovering the existence of a single underlying factor that explains the various clinical manifestations: this single factor is the elementary psychological function of a specific part of the brain. The complete study of the ways in which a complex psychological faculty is damaged in various parts of the brain will reveal its dynamic neurological function and the complex functional system at the basis of this faculty. The elementary psychological function will not be localizable in any particular part of the brain but will be distributed over various areas. This procedure can enable us to identify the neurological organization of any mental function. Solms applied the procedure of dynamic localization to clarify, for example, the neurodynamics of the dream processes.
Other global scientific paradigms exist that can constitute a conceptual glue capable of binding together apparently very distant scientific fields, and thus also psychoanalysis and neuroscience, but reasons of space prevent me from dealing with them here.
There are numerous research areas where the dialogue between psychoanalysis and neuroscience finds fertile ground for application: instinct-energy, dreaming, memory, unconscious-conscious, speech, affects, the thought process, temporalization, psychosomatics, talking cure, and so on.
The metapsychological 'witch' as a science of virtual structures
It seems to me that the theory of wish fulfilment has brought only the psychological solution and not the biological-or, rather, metapsychical-one. (I am going to ask you seriously, by the way, whether I may use the name metapsychology for my psychology that leads behind consciousness.) (Freud's letter to Fliess, 10 March 1898 , Masson, 1985 As almost all the texts tell us, Freud, after an extreme attempt with Project for a scientific psychology (1895) to realize his ambition of developing a scientific psychology connected to neurophysiology and not to anatomy, abandoned this project due to the difficulty of exploring the intermediate levels between the somatic and the psychic with the resources available then, and went on to tackle the problem from an essentially psychological stance. The psychic structures are in fact conceptually 'available' midway between the anatomical level of the nervous system and the mental level, and between this and the behavioural level of our actions.
Following ideas expressed by Kuhn (2000) , I postulate that the incommensurability between different sciences is not only the result of an unsuccessful translation of single concepts: scientists upholding various paradigms find themselves dealing with problems of incommensurability because they construct different lexical taxonomies and, as a result, classify the world in different ways. The languages of others require very different processes of interpretation and acquisition. There is therefore a need to construct reciprocally congruent vocabularies having the same more abstract and more diversified structure compared to the vocabularies of the individual sciences or the mental modules that incorporate it. I would thus like to ask which lingua franca could be used in exchanges between psychoanalysis and neuroscience. For this reason we can reply with Freud, apropos the questions he posed about the relationships between instincts and the ego, and about the way and means by which one would reach satisfaction: 'We can only say: "So muss denn doch die Hexe dran! [We must call the Witch to our help after all! Goethe, Faust, Part I, sc. 6]"-the Witch Metapsychology. Without metapsychological speculation and theorizing-I had almost said "phantasying"-we shall not get another step forward' (Freud, 1937, p. 225) .
Let us listen again to Freud:
We can avoid any possible abuse of this method of representation by recollecting that ideas, thoughts and psychical structures in general must never be regarded as localized in organic elements of the nervous system but rather, as one might say, between them, where resistances and facilitations [Bahnungen] provide the corresponding correlates. Everything that can be an object of our internal perception is virtual, like the image produced in a telescope by the passage of light-rays. But we are justified in assuming the existence of the systems (which are not in any way psychical entities themselves and can never be accessible to our psychical perception) like the lenses of the telescope, which cast the image. (Freud, 1900, p. 611) Many years later he wrote:
Psycho-analysis makes a basic assumption, the discussion of which is reserved to philosophical thought but the justification for which lies in its results. We know two kinds of things about what we call our psyche (or mental life): firstly, its bodily organ and scene of action, the brain (or nervous system) and, on the other hand, our acts of consciousness, which are immediate data and cannot be further explained by any sort of description. Everything that lies between is unknown to us, and the data do not include any direct relation between these two terminal points of our knowledge. If it existed, it would at the most afford an exact localization of the processes of consciousness and would give us no help towards understanding them. (Freud, 1940, p. 144-5, my italics) In the final phrase the difference in the tasks and spheres of neuroanatomical physiology is indirectly denounced, while 'everything that lies between' and, I would add, the process capable of establishing the 'direct relation between these two terminal points of our knowledge' must be theorized in psychoanalytic and metapsychological terms. Even the neuronic apparatus of Freud's Project for a scientific psychology (1895), the text that founded metapsychology, is not an anatomical apparatus, nor a metaphor, but a sort of virtual machine formed from virtual, not material, structures, which we can speak of in psychoanalytic terms. Metapsychology, besides, can act as a common platform of intercommunication for a dialogue with neuroscience. It represents an intermediate level in the hierarchy in which the conceptualization of the psychic apparatus and the possible interconnections and relations between its parts are organized: the systems, sub-systems and, on a higher level, the systems of systems. This provides us with a possibility for more easily finding 'languages' that could place us in a condition to refer to these realities. These languages could be shared, or at least translated, and therefore used in the exchange of knowledge process with neuroscience.
I also recall that Rapaport and Gill (1959) stated that structures are stable processes at a low speed of change, whereas processes are structures in rapid movement and consequently labile. In this way these authors closely connected these two realities; indeed, they demonstrated how they are in some way very similar things that belong to a continuum: two faces of the same coin. The structure is like the warp of our psychism while the processes are the weft. We can also say that they belong 'contemporaneously' to the res cogitans and to the res extensa and that they can be both symbolic and sub-symbolic.
Freud also spoke of structures when he spoke, for example, of 'agencies':
It will soon be clear what the mental apparatus is; but I must beg you not to ask what material it is constructed of. That is not a subject of psychological interest. Psychology can be as indifferent to it as, for instance, optics can be to the question of whether the walls of a telescope are made of metal or cardboard. We shall leave entirely on one side the material line of approach, but not so the spatial one. For we picture the unknown apparatus which serves the activities of the mind as being really like an instrument constructed of several parts (which we speak of as "agencies"), each of which performs a particular function and which have fixed spatial relation-"in front of" and "behind", "superficial" and "deep" -we merely mean in the first instance a representation of the regular succession of the functions. Have I made myself clear? (Freud, 1926, p. 194) Here Freud seems to favour functionalism.
Once we have accepted the conceptual existence of neuropsychic structures, we can proceed further. It is not easy to accurately define the concept of a 'virtual structure', not to be confused with that of essence. It is a polyhedric concept, but I believe it is useful for exploring a field, though its wide-ranging semantic connotations must be borne in mind. How can we theorize about these structures if not with the help of the metapsychological witch?
Many structures exist. Some can be found in the interfaces: for example, in the interface in which Freud's 'mysterious leap' between mind and body occurs; the interface between Ucs. and Pcs. (dream, censorship) and between Pcs. and Pcpt.-Cs.; or the one between the individual and the external world (Reizschutz). We can also include the components of the second topographythe id, the ego and the superego-the representation of object and of word, Bion's α-function, Lacan's signifiers and schemes, the neuronal groups, Edelman's repertoires and maps, the neurons and mirror systems of Rizzolatti et al. (2000 Rizzolatti et al. ( , 2001 , and so on. Even neurotransmitters can be considered 'structures' if we think of their function in the domain of their action with a set of relationships among elements.
Structures indicate abstract entities and abstract insubstantial, but real, processes; processes in progress that elaborate variables of a certain type. Furthermore, it is necessary to postulate that mental energy circulates in these structures, which makes their stability and also the development of mental processes possible.
The parts of the mental system are hierarchically ordered according to a finalistic order and a dynamic connection. The structures I am talking about, therefore, are also organized according to a hierarchical/heteroarchical ordering: they are thus placed on various levels and use different codes to form apparatus or systems. Consequently they need continual transcoding, transduction and translation. A virtual psychic structure is thus formed from the union of a particular mental function and a correlated activity of an anatomical region.
'Parallel' functioning of the various agencies of the psyche enables metapsychology to provide, as Freud says, for the topographical, economic and dynamic point of view. Topography is of a virtual type that indicates the 'localization' of virtual structures; economy is to do with an energy whose true nature we do not know; and dynamics is the parallel working of mechanisms of psychic processes that move constantly from one virtual topos to another equally virtual one, using libidinal energy of an equally unknown nature. They help us to speak about the unspeakable.
It is, however, not the name of these structures that is important, but the fact that they can provide a conceptual model for explaining the facts observed, for example the clinical facts, and that this model allows us to represent the functioning of the mind-body system through ways and rules according to which the parts or single interconnected elements behave.
I hypothesize that metapsychology could be the theory of virtual structures crossed by energy, not isomorphous to the anatomical structures, and of their activities and interconnected relationships. The imaginary, but 'real', immaterial and non-observable structures are sited along a conceptual continuum of a somatopsychic nature placed between the body and the mind. 'Virtuality' is what hides the underlying 'computations' effected by the dynamic processes.
Metapsychology is a sort of speculative metatheory, a metalanguage invented by Freud to theorize his discoveries in the psychological domain. It was the theoretical metareferent that was to serve his intellectual re-elaborations of clinical discoveries made during self-analysis and the analysis of patients. To give theoretical expression to his endopsychic self-perception, Freud, according to his account, had first to express it as though it had been obtained through observing another (self-observation) and then to order it according to a theory using the working through of the secondary process. He thought that the endopsychic perception of the mental factors and relationships of the unconscious had to be translated into a psychology of the unconscious of a scientific and not simply 'introspective' type, as had been done until then. Green (1996) reminds us that '...psychology is bound to restrict its domain to consciousness (at its extreme it can reach the preconscious, but not beyond that point), as psychoanalytic metapsychology deals with what is beyond the wall of consciousness and has its roots in the body. Desire is not equal to motivation or intentionality' (p. 13, my italics). Metapsychology, therefore, is sited beyond and behind consciousness and beyond psychology, unlike the psychology of previously existing philosophical systems. It is thus a metapsychology placed on a higher level of abstraction compared to psychology but its conceptual space is sited lower down: both in an in-between area between biology and psychology providing the latter with a highly abstract signifying and symbolizing activity, and in the ontological foundations of psychism. So meta-(neuro)-psychology could be the science of virtual structures, organized around a conceptual self-referencing triadic structure formed, for example, by 'depth-psychology', by clinical theory and by neurophysiology. The current issue is the need to set possibilities in motion again for reelaborating new propositional metapsychological mixtures (see Molinari, 1979) in order to resume the dialogue between psychoanalysis and neuroscience.
In short, we can say, paradoxically, that if we use metapsychology in this sense, it places itself at the basis of psychoscience and neuroscience, and not the contrary. In other words, this abstract science lies at the basis of the science of psychobiological structures.
Dealing with fundamental structures of the psyche such as the intermediate matrix, metapsychology could be the part of psychoanalysis capable of making the invisible visible. It could constitute the system of notations capable of dealing with the theoretically abstract levels of psychoanalysis and, therefore, of protecting the latter from the danger of falling into the hands of quackery and hearsay. So, metapsychology could constitute a sort of 'middle language' still to be created of psychoanalysis, a lingua franca, a bridge capable of bringing about dialogue between psychoanalysis and neuroscience. It might perhaps be more correct to say that metapsychology could be one of the links capable of developing a common conceptual platform, formed for example by several integrated models, as well as elaborating a common lexis and vocabulary that would allow greater communication between different domains dealing with different objects.
An example of dialogue between psychoanalysis and neuroscience
Psychoanalysis is a scientific psychology also and above all because it does not oppose the mind to the body, but considers it a differentiated function of bodily functioning. It does not therefore intend to oppose neurophysiology, but waits instead to learn from it the neurophysiological functioning that lies at the basis of the mental function. The need to distinguish these functionings did not arise in Freud's mind as a capricious invention, but as the natural consequence of his profound participation in the vicissitudes of scientific advancement during the second half of the last century. (Gaddini, 1980b, p. 501, my italics) I would now like to propose some considerations on the results of recent neurophysiological research, which seem to offer psychoanalysis possibilities for finding the anatomical basis and the anatomical-physiological correlates of various well-known psychic phenomena and mechanisms: imitation, introjection, introjective identification and identification tout court, empathy, identity, consciousness, learning, aspects of the mother-child relationship, of communication in social relationships, of talking cures, and so on.
Neurophysiological research conducted by Rizzolatti et al. (2000 Rizzolatti et al. ( , 2001 confirms that a new class of visual-motor neurons has been discovered in the premotor cortex of monkeys: mirror neurons. These neurons become active both when a particular action is performed by the monkey under examination and when the same action, performed by another individual, is observed. Mirror neurons seem to make up a cortical system that combines the observation and execution of motor actions that have an objective.
These experiments demonstrate that the 'mirror' system, or better the 'mirror systems', which compare observation of an action and its execution, are not a prerogative of the premotor cortex alone, but that they extend to the posterior parietal lobe. This research shows that the sensory-motor integration process, supported by the F5-PF frontal-parietal network, instantiates an 'internal copy' of the actions used, not only to generate object behavioural controls, but also to provide-at a prereflective and prelinguistic level-a significant account of the behaviour of other individuals. Indeed at times it would seem that the researchers hypothesize that the whole brain works as a mirror system. It is interesting to note that mirror neurons exist in man too. They are situated within an area of the brain that corresponds to the front part of Broca's area (motor area of language). When these neurons become active, the motor system reacts to the action of the agent observed and they respond automatically, a sort of simulation or, we will say, imitation, since it involves a nonintentional but unaware and automatic process: in the case of man we can say 'non-conscious' or 'unconscious'. Gallese and Goldman (1998) also believe it is difficult to conceptualize these replies in purely sensory and motor terms. It is more plausible to postulate that the objects whose observation elicits the neurons' responses are analysed in relational terms. So the researchers ask: 'What is the function of the mirror system? One possible function could be to promote learning by imitation. When new motor skills are learned, one often spends the first training phases trying to replicate the movements of an observed instructor. MNs could in principle facilitate that kind of learning.' And they add: 'We do not favor this possible role of MNs, at least in non-human primates. Here we explore another possibility: that MNs underlie the process of "mind-reading", or serve as precursors to such a process' (p. 495). The hypothesis is that the same mechanism, which they call 'embodied simulation', whose neuroanatomical-physiological correlate consists of mirror systems, lies at the basis of both imitation and empathy. These mirror systems, and the relative mechanism of imitation, are part of the dynamics of the process of learning, communication and identity.
Here I also briefly recall certain experiments reported by Singer et al. (2004) that demonstrate the existence of parts of cerebral regions (somatosensory cortex, insula, cingulate cortex, thalamus, brainstem, cerebellum etc.) involved in the empathy phenomenon. These areas become active when a subject observes another subject while experiencing a painful stimulus, but in the observer only the structures involved in the 'affective' response are activated, not the sensory ones.
I would now like to introduce a psychic functioning mechanism that Gaddini (1969) studied and called 'imitation', and to give it a definition. However, Freud had already spoken of something very similar: '"Having" and "being" in children. Children like expressing an object-relation by an identification: "I am the object." "Having" is the later of the two; after loss of the object it relapses into "being". Example: the breast. "The breast is a part of me, I am the breast." Only later: "I have it"-that is, "I am not it"…' (Freud, 1941, p. 299) . This quotation, incidentally, leads us to venture that Freud supported a co-existential relational ontology in which 'being', strongly linked to the biological, precedes consciousness and the cogito of a Cartesian nature, thus not conforming to the well-known formula of cogito ergo sum.
Gaddini maintains:
In discussing (1969) the early vicissitudes of the relationship with the object, I distinguished between two areas of mental experience, corresponding to a two-fold primitive attitude towards the object, defining them as the psychosensory (or sensory psychic) and the psycho-oral (or oral psychic) areas respectively. The first, and more ancient, has its source in primitive perception through the soma, while the second is connected with the gradual perceptual recognition of stimuli external to the self, as through oral activity. … The activity of the psychosensory area develops in accordance with a functional model-"imitation in order to be"-which is the psychical equivalent of the biological model of primitive perception ("imitation in order to perceive") and leads to the hallucinatory image, to fantasies of fusion by way of magical identity with the object and to imitations, in the direction of "being" the object, and hence of not acknowledging it as external and separate. The activity of the psycho-oral area, on the other hand, develops on the basis of the functional model of introjection-which is the psychical equivalent of the biological model of incorporation-and leads to fantasies of fusion through the taking of the object into one's own self, in the direction of "possessing" the object, involving the gradual recognition of the object as external to the self and the need to confront real dependence on the object. (1974, p. 62-3) .
Let us remember that what Gaddini called the psychosensory area, as he himself tells us in a note (1974, p. 82) , corresponds to Winnicott's pure female element (1971) connected to 'being', while what he called the psycho-oral area (object area) connected to the instincts and to 'doing' corresponds to Winnicott's pure male element. Gaddini (1969) says something that incontrovertibly relates perfectly to the proposition I want to sustain:
...the biological model, "imitating in order to perceive", changes into the parallel psychic model, in which to perceive becomes "to be". "Imitating in order to be". Or rather, perceiving is still, as before, "being", but whereas this occurred previously on a prevailing physical level, it now does so on one which tends towards the psychic.
We Now even in the case of Gallese's imitation, the important thing is the activation of the perceiver's mirror neurons, that is, his perceptive modification. Gaddini also asserts that the child's first knowledge process is performed by the motility that is linked to the mechanism of imitation: first to 'imitating in order to perceive' and then to 'imitating in order to know'. Therefore the physical model of imitating to perceive is transformed into a parallel psychic model of 'imitating in order to be'. So it seems as though we are waiting for nothing else but to discover the anatomical basis of these processes and observe how it is 'transformed' in the psychic processes: 'mirror neurons' and the fact that their organization supports a function that we will call 'simulation' (Gallese) or 'imitation' (Gaddini) .
Indeed Gaddini, again, talks of introjection and incorporation:
From this we can deduce that the basic model is parallel to, but differentiated from, the corporeal one, and therefore that mental functioning as distinguished from that of the body already exists when a basic mental model is established parallel to the physical one. What we do not know, but hope eventually to find out from those disciplines which study corporeal functioning, is just how a physical functional model is converted into a parallel psychical one. We can agree that this still remains unsolved today, at least if the question is posed in these terms. Here we are in the heart of the mind-body problem which merits individual attention. Further on, though, Gaddini tries to tackle the question, giving us some indications:
Apropos of this, it would appear that the establishment of a parallel model is impossible before that of the "memory" of a physiological model. The memory, in fact, could play a crucial role in the passage from physiological to mental functioning, and in terms of development, it could indicate the presumable moment of intrauterine life when this passage can begin. (1980a, p. 121-2, my italics)
Gallese hypothesizes that there might be a mechanism that supports our capacity for sharing feelings and emotions with others in an extralinguistic way. He proposes that even the feelings and emotions shown by others can be 'empathized', and therefore implicitly understood, through a type of mirror-matching mechanism. Here it is possible to highlight the fact that constitution of the self-other identity is a strength that guides the cognitive and psychic development of more articulated and sophisticated forms of intersubjective relationships. It is also possible that the mirror-matching systems may be involved in the construction of identity and that the concept of empathy could be extended with the aim of opening up possibilities for unifying the diverse aspects and possible levels of the description of non-verbal intersubjective relationships. It is the otherness of the other that founds the objective nature of reality, and our subjectivity, through differences.
The capacity to understand others does not depend only on mental-linguistic skills, but also on the relational nature of action (Gallese, 2001, p. 78) , of being in the world in a situational and co-existential dimension. Furthermore, if we consider the function of the mirror neurons one can see how 'passivity is thereby transformed into activity (e.g. self-restraint) at the same time as action is transformed into thought' (Solms and Turnbull, 2002, p. 283) ; a further step towards bridging Freud's 'mysterious leap' through the transformation processes of the quantitative into the qualitative.
I now point out the implications of this research on our psychoanalytic science, other than the mechanism of imitation already discussed. Remaining in the same thematic area, the existence and functioning of mirror neurons can also be connected, for example, to the 'mirror function' performed for the child by its mother's face with the aim of restoring the child's self to him (Winnicott, 1967) and thus also contributing to his identity formation. Regarding this, Winnicott says that the mother's face is the precursor of the mirror. We note how even the mother's facial mimicry can be considered a form of 'expressive action' in which the child 'is reflected', a sort of expressive-motor feedback. So what is at play is something more specifically bound to the relationship and affective mother-environment/infant empathic 'attunement' and therefore, perhaps, patient-analyst, even if the consensual relinquishing of motor activity has occurred in psychoanalysis in favour of linguistic expression-its substitute and heir. This expression represents the strong point of a strategy directed towards encouraging the transforming operations of emotional experiences. As well as being affective, this tuning must also be pragmatic and motor, in the wide-ranging sense in which I have used this term. It must include tuning that is realized also through motor mirroring, both on a pragmatic and a neuronal level, to which a synaptic restructuring will connect (see also Kandel, 1979) . Rizzuto (1995) points out that the first contact between mother and child is sensory, in a period before the child is capable of understanding the referential and symbolic meaning of words heard. The discovery of mirror neurons sustains the importance of visual-motor contact. The first communication system between parents and child is not therefore semantic, but sensorial and sensory-motor (visual-motor), and is an important support in identification processes. Therefore, the connection between Gallese's 'learning by imitation' and Gaddini's 'imitating in order to know' and 'imitating in order to be' now seems clear. Both merge into an imitative process aimed at developing the internal communication processes and the act of becoming conscious-passage from automatism to consciousness-together with non-verbal empathetic communication processes, co-cognitive processes and the processes of co-identity development, interaction and social intercommunication, of which a particular instance is the complex analyst-patient interaction during the talking cure.
May I recall the fact that the mirror systems becoming active when the subject observes an action performed by an 'other' indicates that the activation of mirror neurons does not correspond to a voluntary activity, but to an automatic and mental one. The psychic mechanism of imitation, with a strong perceptive component, is also involuntary, indeed unconscious, so that there does not seem to be any preliminary impediment to the connection between these two phenomena-the psychic mechanism and its neurophysiological counterpart. In both cases imitation is a very precocious activity of the functioning of the brain and of psychism. In one case it lies at the basis of all the phenomena of animal imitative learning; in the other, instead, it lies at the basis of human identification processes. I would like to point out that in everything that has been said there is no mere reductionism nor any culpable lack of empirical proof, since psychoanalysis of course cannot be verified empirically. But the opportunity exists for making conjectures that must then be corroborated and verified with 'psychoanalytic instruments'.
Conclusions
…for the psychical field, the biological field does in fact play the part of the underlying bedrock. (Freud, 1937, p. 252) Psychoanalytic theoreticians, beginning with Freud himself, have repeatedly asserted that one day the gap between psychoanalytic theory and neurophysiology will be bridged. This gap will never be bridged, however, unless psychoanalysts make an effort to make it bridgeable. (Rubinstein, 1967, p. 110) In its simple assertiveness Freud's phrase above tells us much more, in my opinion, than might at first appear. It tells us that Freud recognized that the 'psychic domain' could not be separated from the 'biological' one. In other words, if we prefer not to espouse 'strong' Cartesian dualism but to remain monists, we must necessarily preserve the conceptual link with the 'biological bedrock' in all senses, at the risk of verging on 'spiritualism'. Even if Freud often seems to oscillate between antithetical positions, his is never an ontological dualism but at most a 'conventionalistic' dualism. However, Freud, referring to the 'primitive conception of a soul', said that: 'This original "duality", to borrow an expression from Herbert Spencer (1893), is identical with the dualism proclaimed by our current distinction between soul and body and by such ineradicable linguistic expressions of it... ' (1913, p. 93, my italics) .
The fact remains that psychoanalysts continue to think in a dualistic way and necessarily to use two types of science to study the body and the mind: at times this can give rise to the illusion that we are dealing with two separate entities, but only the 'linguistic expressions' cannot be 'extirpated'. I recall Green (1991) who prefers to speak of the 'dualism of gathering' that is different from the 'dualism of separation', rather than of monism. With this he intends 'the difference in structure between psychic and non-psychic (= somatic) not a difference in being ' (p. 48) .
In actual fact, Freud was less interested in the dualism between body and mind than in that between conscious and unconscious processes. He aspired to finding the hidden variable, a single neuropsychic cause capable of producing a specific effect, on which he would build a metascience that included the sciences of the body and of the mind. He aspired to find the biological base, the psychological factors of the living and a theory that would explain both. For this reason he was uninterested in taking up a 'strong' position on the mind-body problem, but nevertheless felt the danger that his science, psychoanalysis, might become disembodied and therefore increasingly disconnected to the natural sciences. I believe that he alluded to this danger during a meeting with Jung in Vienna in 1910. According to Jung (1961) , Freud warned him 'never to abandon the sexual theory' which would be needed as 'a dogma … an unshakeable bulwark … against the black tide of mud … of occultism' (p. 150) Jung regarded this as a demand for his faith, as his minister father had demanded it.
Various aspects of 'anatomy'-if we use the term extensively-exist, from anatomy 'itself', whose unknowableness we claim, to the imaginary anatomy that Freud, for example, attributed to the hysteric: '...since in its paralyses and other manifestations hysteria behaves as though anatomy did not exist or as though it had no knowledge of it' (Freud, 1893, p. 169, Freud's italics) .
Another sort of anatomy exists as conceptualized by Maturana and Varela (1980) , who say that every component of the nervous system which the observer describes is defined within the domain of the interactions of his observation, and as such it is alien to the system that it is supposed to integrate. Every function has a structure that materializes it and makes it possible, but this structure is defined by the function within its operating domain as a set of relations among structural elements, also defined within this domain. Neurons are the anatomical units of the nervous system, but they are not the structural elements of its functioning. The structural elements of the functioning nervous system have not yet been defined, and it will probably be evident, when they are defined, that they have to be expressed in terms of invariants of relative activities among neurons, in some way materialized in invariants of relations of interconnections, and not in terms of separate anatomical units.
This concept of 'anatomy' can form a basis for a common platform for dialogue between psychoanalysis and neuroscience.
Posing the question that Solms (1995a) does, whether the brain is more real than the mind, it is also timely to ask whether the psyche is more real than the brain. Friedman rightly says: 'I would argue that the task goes beyond finding "the" brain in "our" minds and "our" minds in "the" brain. Rather, it is re-finding the agency of psyche in both that would realize this ambition ' (2004, p. 2) . Analysts must also, though, look at the 'other face of the mirror', the subsymbolic physiological apparatus, because: 'We are convinced that everything that is reflected in our subjective experience is closely connected to physiological processes that can be investigated in an objective way, that it bases themselves on these, and that, in some mysterious way, it even identifies with them' (Lorenz, 1974, p. 22, my italics) .
On the other hand, according to Friedman (1998) , unfortunately the extreme current appreciation for the experimental sphere as the arbiter of every claim for truth must be considered, and the idea that the process, if reliable and valid, can be executed in an anonymous way, that is, by anyone indiscriminately. The important thing is to think that the character, integrity or any other attribute of the experimenter as an individual must not in any way influence the research data. But Friedman points out that for a long time now the thinker-scientist in 'mental experiments' has been anything but anonymous. The experiment can be repeated, but the fact remains that there was an initial author. In the same way, in the psychoanalysis of Freud there is nothing impersonal. Psychoanalysis therefore can play an important role for other sciences (including neuroscience) in emphasizing, beyond 'laws', not only the importance of subjectivity and individuality, but also the importance of what Prigogine (1992) calls the event, the importance of evolution, of time and therefore of history, probability and uncertainty.
Freudian psychoanalysis is based on neither an 'objective' neurophysiological nor a metapsychological ontology, and even less on a 'subjective' narratological ontology that alienates the subject from his history; it is based on a psychological ontology of historiographic subjectivity within intersubjectivity. All this, however, emerges from the neurophysiological 'background' of the biology of the brain and can be described in metapsychological terms. Psychoanalysis is based above all on the 'unconscious' psyche of its inventor in dialogue with himself and his interlocutors, especially patients and colleagues, the Other and others. It is therefore part of the psychic reality of its inventor, re-elaborated through the secondary process, which constitutes its 'foundation'. In short, it is founded on an ontology not of substances but of event flows (Manzotti and Tagliasco, 2004) . This makes psychoanalysis an ontological science since it is also a science of foundations.
On the cultural issue in the psychoanalytic field, I believe that the rekindling of interest in neuroscience represents the current expression of the so-called psychoanalytic 'crisis'. I use the word 'crisis' both in its negative connotation, as a term to define a certain decrease in the heuristic potential of current 'alternative' trends compared to 'pure psychoanalysis', and in its positive connotation, as a stimulus towards possible developments on the scientific level whose outcome cannot yet be foreseen. I believe this is the reason why certain areas are once more seeking 'support' from the observing sciences and strong theories in order to effect that 'step backwards' towards neuroscience that is capable of jump-starting psychoanalytic research towards the future, by referring to and taking up Freud's teaching once again. Analysts must recognize their 'unrecognized debt' to neuroscience just as they must claim collection of an 'unrecognized credit' from neuroscience.
Psychoanalysis is at the beginnings of research that has only scratched the surface of an issue of profound complexity, but I believe that our community stands before an opportunity for resuming Freud's project once again and that this will be the challenge of the next few years. Psychoanalysts are at a historic gnoseologic and heuristic turning point capable of leading towards unforeseeable expansions in knowledge. This will decide the road that psychoanalysis will choose to take in the near future: scientific development, which is intrinsic to it, or 'occultism'.
